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Strategic Insight 
The Battle of Midway 
by Douglas Porch and James J. Wirtz 
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CCC is the research arm of the National Security Affairs Department at the Naval Postgraduate School in 
Monterey, California. The views expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily 
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June 4, 2002 
The Battle of Midway, fought between 4 and 7 June 1942, marked the turning point of the Pacific War. 
Until Midway, the Japanese navy, building on the 7 December 1941 surprise attack against the U.S. fleet 
at Pearl Harbor, held the strategic initiative. The Philippines, Singapore, Burma and the Dutch East Indies 
fell to the seemingly unstoppable Japanese juggernaut. After Midway, the Japanese march to victory 
turned to defeat. Midway so reduced Japanese carrier strength that henceforth the Rising Sun was 
condemned to react to the relentless American advance across the Pacific toward Japan's home islands. 
 
U.S. forces as they prepared to ambush the Japanese in Hawaiian waters 
Operationally and tactically, defects in U.S. command and control, the technical shortcomings of U.S. 
aircraft, and the inexperience of American pilots revealed at Midway have caused some historians to 
attribute the American victory to Japanese mistakes and sheer blind luck. While both factors certainly 
assisted the American triumph, the victory at Midway was in fact constructed on a solid framework of U.S. 
strengths unmatched by those of the enemy. These included the tactical brilliance of the untested and 
until then relatively unknown Rear-Admiral Raymond Spruance, the superiority of U.S. intelligence, and a 
forward-looking operational concept that saw the carrier task force, rather than the battleship, as the core 
and main organizing principle of fleet action. U.S. aircraft losses at Midway were significant largely 
because officers inexperienced in combat were condemned to fly obsolete aircraft. But the courage and 
perseverance of American pilots of all services in the face of technologically and tactically superior 
Japanese forces held out the promise that, once the materiel and tactical battlefield was leveled, they 
would sweep their adversaries from the skies. 
The origins of the Battle of Midway lay in the Doolittle Raid of 15 April 1942. The specter of sixteen Army 
Air Force B-25 medium bombers, launched from the carriers Hornet and Enterprise that had crept to 
within 500 miles of Japan, in the skies over Tokyo delivered a severe psychological blow to the Japanese, 
one that exceeded by far the negligible physical damage left in Doolittle's wake. Humiliated by their failure 
to protect their homeland and their Emperor, the Japanese military resolved to invade Midway Island as a 
first step in completing the unfinished business of 7 December 1941. Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto 





This feint was calculated to draw elements of the smaller U.S. fleet north. Simultaneously, Yamamoto 
divided his remaining naval forces into three groups that would approach Midway from separate 
directions -- a Midway Occupation Force of transports and escort vessels under Admiral Kondo Nobutake; 
a strike force built around four carriers and 261 aircraft commanded by Vice-Admiral Chuichi Nagumo that 
would soften up the island for invasion; finally, Yamamoto would lurk 300 miles to the west of Midway with 
three battleships and a small carrier (Main Body) to crush the U.S. fleet that, goaded by the attack on 
Midway, was expected to steam out from Pearl to be sunk in a climactic re-enactment of Tsushima. With 
the bulk of the U.S. fleet at the bottom of the ocean, Hawaii would lay defenseless. With their main Pacific 
naval base in Japanese hands, and the West Coast of the United States vulnerable to attack, Yamamoto 
calculated that the United States would sue for peace. At a minimum, the Japanese would have denied 
Americans use of the Aleutian and Hawaiian Islands, which contained bases they mistakenly suspected 
had been used to launch the Doolittle raid. 
As the weaker power, Yamamoto believed that Japan must land a crippling blow on the U.S. Navy early 
on, rather than wait passively until superior American strength was brought to bear. The Japanese 
Admiral's strategy was sound in that it sought to make time work for Tokyo. But Yamamoto's meticulous 
calculations collapsed on the operational level because his battle plan contained at least three critical 
defects. First, he assumed that, as at Pearl Harbor, he would command the advantage of surprise. But 
the idea of a Japanese surprise naval strike against the Hawaiian Islands was no longer novel after Pearl 
Harbor; U.S. naval intelligence analysts were doing everything in their power to detect Japanese 
intentions, especially evidence that a major attack against Hawaii was in the works. Because his ships 
were dispersed, Yamamoto broadcast his plan for the Midway operation by radio in an outdated code that 
had been broken by U.S. intelligence, an indiscretion that was pounced upon by U.S. cryptanalysts (see 
inset box below). As a consequence, the Americans were forewarned of the time, place and direction of 
Yamamoto's attacks, while inadequate Japanese reconnaissance meant that the Japanese Admiral had 
been left in the dark about the strength and disposition of U.S. forces. In particular, the Japanese had not 
counted on the appearance of the Yorktown, which they believed sunk during the Battle of the Coral Sea 
(4-8 May, 1942). Second, the Japanese admiral violated the principle of "concentration of force" by 
scattering his numerically superior fleet between the Aleutians and various point around Midway. This 
allowed them to be attacked piecemeal by Spruance. Finally, he looked to administer the coup de grâce 
to the U.S. fleet with a Mahanian-style battle fought between surface ships. Unfortunately for Yamamoto, 
Spruance planned to duel with planes, not guns. Yamamoto would never have the opportunity to bring his 
battleship force into the fight. 
Where is "AF"? 
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 11 September, much attention has been focused on 
intelligence failure. By contrast, the American victory at Midway was the product of one of the 
greatest intelligence successes of all time. The story of the success is complicated, but one 
instance demonstrates that it is possible to "link the dots" by working with incomplete pieces of 
data to form a complete picture of what is about to transpire.  
OP-20-G, the Navy Signals intelligence shop at Pearl Harbor was under the gun in early 1942. 
These analysts listened to Japanese navy radio traffic to detect patterns of activity and to try to 
read coded messages transmitted by the Japanese. OP-20-G had failed to give any warning 
about Pearl Harbor, but with a war on, Japanese radio traffic had increased and they had 
gained "entry" into the Japanese Navy's code (JN25b). They were able to intercept about 60 
percent of Imperial Navy traffic, read about 40 percent of intercepted messages and actually 
decode about 10 percent of the Japanese radio messages that used JN25b. By 6 May Navy 
analysts recognized that something "big was brewing": they intercepted and decoded a 
message suggesting Japanese were readying their aircraft carriers for a major operation. On 
13 May they intercepted a message for a Seaplane unit to prepare to move to "AF." 
Navy codebreakers knew that the term "AF" represented grid coordinates for a location on 
secret Japanese maps and they suspected that it referred to Midway. To test their theory, they 
told the U.S. garrison at Midway via a secure underwater cable to radio "in the clear" that their 
water desalinization plant had failed. Japanese intelligence intercepted the message and on 16 
May they broadcast a message in their JN25b code that "AF" was running short of water. 
Intelligence officers were thus able to confirm their suspicion that the Japanese intended to 
invade Midway. The "AF" incident is a rare example of intelligence analysts using a "Tripwire" 
in a control experiment to confirm their estimates. 
On 25 May 1942 OP-20-G intercepted a message giving 4 June as the date for the attack on 
"AF." On 28 May, the Japanese changed their cipher (JN25c) ending for a time OP-20G's 
ability to gain insights into Japanese intentions. Admiral Nimitz and his staff spent the next 
several days nervously wondering if they would be proven correct. One officer noted in the 
command diary on 27 May "Of course it may turn out that the Japanese are pulling our leg and 
using radio deception on a grand scale." 
Because of these miscalculations, Yamamoto unknowingly steamed toward an ambush laid by Admiral 
Chester Nimitz, who ordered Spruance to stand off to the northeast of Midway, beyond the range of 
Japanese search planes. An Army Air Force B-17 spotted the approaching Japanese fleet on the morning 
of 3 June. Early on the morning of 4 June, Nagumo launched half of his planes at Midway. Thirty-eight 
were shot down and a further thirty were so damaged that they had to be written off. Nevertheless, 
Nagumo ordered a second attack against the island. He had begun to rearm his remaining aircraft with 
high-explosive bombs effective against American facilities on the atoll when Japanese reconnaissance 
aircraft spied Spruance's approaching Task Force 16. However, they failed to detect the carriers Hornet, 
Enterprise and Yorktown. Nagumo halted the rearmament of his planes while he waited to ascertain the 
configuration of the American armada. He also needed to recover aircraft returning from his Midway raid. 
It proved a fatal hesitation because it left ordnance and fueled aircraft scattered around the hanger and 
flight decks of the Japanese aircraft carriers. At 0800 on 4 June, Spruance launched his entire strike force 
of sixty-eight dive-bombers, thirty torpedo planes and twenty fighters at an extreme range of 150 miles 
from Nagumo's fleet. Most of the American attackers, especially two entire squadrons of obsolete 
Devastator torpedo planes, fell victim to Japanese anti-aircraft fire and to the redoubtable Japanese Zero 
fighter planes. 
  
Dauntless Dive Bomber Japanese Zero 
However, a handful of Dauntless dive-bombers from the Enterprise reduced the carriers Akagi, Kaga and 
Soryu to smoldering hulks. Japanese dive-bombers and torpedo planes from the surviving carrier Hiryu 
exacted a modicum of revenge in late morning by disabling the Yorktown. Barely a dozen of the Hiryu's 
planes had survived the attack on the Yorktown, too few to defend effectively against the wave of dive-
bombers from the Enterprise that destroyed the Hiryu later that afternoon. Even though a Japanese 
submarine put an end to salvage efforts on the Yorktown, hitting her with several torpedoes, sinking 
Yorktown proved scant compensation. The Americans could replace the Yorktown while Japanese naval 
power had been sustained a mortal wound because they could not replace the four aircraft carriers they 
lost in the battle. 
 
The American aircraft carrier Yorktown lists after being struck repeatedly by Japanese carrier aircraft 
during the Battle of Midway. Although it was in danger of capsizing and abandoned by its crew, a 
small volunteer salvage party aboard Yorktown had managed to stabilize the vessel. It was about to 
be taken under tow when a Japanese submarine sank it.  
Spruance retired his outgunned Task Force to the east to avoid the prospect of a night battle at which the 
Japanese navy excelled. Belatedly, Yamamoto attempted to unite the remnants of his dispersed force, 
and recall his two carriers from the Aleutians to even his odds against the Americans and to lash Midway 
with a punishing bombardment. By early morning of 5 June, aware that he was now without carriers, he 
reversed course, and steamed toward home. In the confusion caused by the appearance of the U.S. 
submarine Tambor, the cruisers Mikuma and Mogami collided. As the disabled Japanese ships limped 
eastward at 12 knots, planes from the Enterprise and Hornet sunk the Mikuma and so damaged the 
Mogami that it was out of the war for a year. 
Yamamoto had been dealt a stunning defeat, sacrificing four carriers, a cruiser and the flower of Japan's 
naval air corps, most of whom had perished while sitting on the decks of his carriers waiting to rearm. The 
Japanese shifted to the defensive, abandoning plans to attack New Caledonia, Fiji, Samoa, and New 
Guinea. Instead, they allowed themselves to be drawn into an attritional battle in the Solomons, in the 
process losing ships that they could never replace. Spruance was confirmed the U.S. Navy's new 
wunderkind. The concept of the carrier battle group was validated. The U.S. Navy would henceforth take 
the offensive in the Pacific. 
For more topical analysis from the CCC, see our Strategic Insights section. 
For related links, see our East Asia Resources. 
 
